(6) 有关论述参见Alexander Eckstein, "Economic Development and Political change in Communist System," in World Politics, 22 (July 1970); George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society (New York: Atherton Press, 1968); Peter Ludz, The changing Party Elite in East Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972); 和 Thomas A. Baylis, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite (University of California Press, 1974). (7) 有关论述参见John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development: Persistent Myths and Changing Behavior, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968); John Kautsky, "Revolutionary and Managerial Elite in Modernizing Regimes," in Comparative Politics, I, No. 4 (July, 1969) pp. 441-467; Robert H. Donaldos and Derek J. Waller, Stasis and Change in Revolutionary Elites: A Comparative Analysis of the 1956 Party Central Committees in China and the USSR, (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970), pp. 621-627; Chalmers Johnson, "Comparative Communist Nations," in Johnson (ed.) Change in Communist Systems, (Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 1-32; 和 Richard Lowenthal, "Development Vs. Utopia in Communist Policy," ibid., pp. 33-116. (8) Cheng Li and David Bachman, "Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social Change in Post-Mao (9) 有关论述参见William deb. Mills, "Generational Change in China," Problems of Communism, no. 32 (November-December, 1983); Xiaowei Zang, "Elite Formation and the emergence of the Bureaucratic-Technocracy in Past-Mao China," Asian Survey, June 1991; Hong Yung Lee, "China's 12th Central Committee: Rehabilitated Cadres and Technocrats," Asian Survey, June 1983 and From Revolutionary Cadre to Party Technocrats in Socialist China, (University of California Press, 1991); and Cheng Li and Lynn White, "The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizater to Managers," Asian Survey, (April 1988) and idem., "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy," The China Quarterly, no. 121, (March 1990). (10) 有关论述参见Kenneth Prewitt and Alan Stone, The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, And American Democracy, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973), Chapter 7; 有关帕森斯的讨论,见他的著作:The structure of Social Action, (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 1:278-288. (11) Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 259. (12) Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentic-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 171. (13) Jack Bielasiak, "Elite Studies and Communist System," in Ronals H. Linden and Bert A. Rockman eds., Elite Studies and Communist Politics: Essays in Memory of Carl Beck, (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984), p. 116. (14) Ying-mao Kau, "Urban Bureaucratic Elite in Communist China: a case study of (15) Derek J. Waller, "The evolution of the Chinese Communist Political Elite, 1931-56," in Robert A. Scalapino ed. Elites in the People's Republic of China, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1972), pp. 56-57, 65. (16) 关于1956年至1962年间知识分子政策在党内领导层的不同意见,见薄一波《若干重大决策与事件的回顾》上、下卷(中共中央党校出版社,1991年版),第503-509页和第984-1013页。 (17) Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A historical Perspective, (The University Of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 152-153. (18) 事实上,早在1938年革命战争年代,毛泽东就提出“政治路线确定之后,干部就是决定的因素”的论断,随后的党的历次重大政治斗争和历史性转变时期,这一论断成为确保党的既定政治路线如实贯彻的一条重要的政治训诫。在80年代精英转换时期,这一训诫也一再被党的领导层所强调,在邓小平政治路线确定以后,新的干部录用政策所规定的“四化标准”(革命化、年轻化、知识化、专业化)仍然将政治标准放在第一位。 (19) Carol Lee Hamrin, (21) 美国学者Martine King Whyte对自1945年至1980年期间党的领导人批评官僚主义的言论和观点进行了分析比较。他发现,毛泽东(1967年)、刘少奇(1945年)、周恩来(1963年)和邓小平(1980年)在不同时期对官僚主义的危害和弊端的认识和批评有许多相似的地方。见Whyte, "Who Hates Bureaucracy? A Chinese Puzzle," in Victor Nee ed. Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: (22) Harry Harding, Ibid., p. 341. Notes. (23) Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist (24) 参见Melanie Manion, "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer, and Removal of Party and State Leaders," in The China Quarterly, no. 102, June 1985, pp. 203-233; 以及John P. Burns, "China's Nomenklatura System," in Problems of Communism, 36, no. 5, Sept-Oct. 1987, pp. 36-51. (25) 领导干部享受的这些好处和特权包括高薪水、高标准的住房、特殊的医疗条件、为子女提供更好的受教育条件以及接触更多的政治与政策信息(在金字塔权力结构中,拥有更多的政治与政策信息意味着拥有更多的权力和权威)等。毛后经济改革使非国有经济成分快速的增长,国家不再是经济资源唯一的控制者和分配者,但是,领导干部的获得的好处和特权仍然有许多是一般人所不能得到的。 (26) 邹谠对该规范在毛泽东和邓小平时代的运用作了精辟的分析。见Tsou, "The Tianamen Tragedy: the State-Society Relationship, Choices, and Mechanisms in Historical Perspective," in Brantly Womack, ed., Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 284-295. (27) 邓小平指出,“任何一个领导集体都要有一个核心,没有核心的领导是靠不住的。第一代领导集体的核心是毛主席。因为有了毛主席作为领导核心,‘文化大革命’就没有把共产党打倒。第二代实际上我是核心。因为有了核心,即使发生了两个领导人的变动,都没有影响我们党的领导,党的领导始终是稳定的。进入第三代的领导集体也必须有一个核心,这一点所有在座的同志都要以高度的自觉性来理解和处理。要有意识地维护一个核心,也就是现在大家同意的江泽民同志”。《邓小平文选》第三卷,第310页。 (28) 党政“双轨”官僚系统建立于50年代,此后,党的系统在双轨系统中一直处于重要的领导地位,党在各级政府的组织在重要决策、干部官员的任用以及对政府部门的政治行政监督等方面都具有十分重要的作用。见A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power, pp. 18-19. (29) 邓小平在1982年初一次中央政治局会议上说:“精简是革命,选贤任能也是革命。这是一道手脚,出要解决好,更重要的是解决进,不要以后再来搞运动解决这个事。这次也算是一个小运动。”见邓小平:“精简机构是一场革命”,《邓小平文选》第二卷,第401页。 (30) Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon To Balance-Of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in (31) 有关1984年干部管理权限的改革的细节,可见: John P. Burns, "China's Nomenklatura System," in Problems of Communism, 36, no. 5, Sept-Oct. 1987, pp. 36-51. (32) 乔石:“当前组织工作的基本问题”,见《组工通讯》1985年第212页。 (33) 关于中国动员式执行体制的问题,对毛时代的研究可见:Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon To Balance-Of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in (34) Bernard S. Silberman, Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in |