近来频发的劳资纠纷看似没有政治意义，其实不然。然而，也不能就此指望中国高度集权的领导方式立即出现什么转机。

　　中国时下的劳资纠纷在许多人看来，只是劳动力市场对外企薪酬过低的回应。这种说法确实颇有道理。由于人口结构的变化，输往沿海出口加工区的超低价农村青壮劳动力减少，他们也因此获得了更多讨价还价的资本。

　　但如果仅从经济角度解释这批理直气壮的新生工人力量，显然遗漏了更为重要且更为有趣的政治语境。因为目前已有诸多迹象表明中国公民社会出现了更广泛的政治觉醒，工人运动仅仅是冰山一角。

　　许多年来，西方观察家一直为中国政治上鲜有变化而懊丧。现代化理论预言，高速的经济发展将帮助政治体制实现自由化，然而这尚未在1989年后的中国应验。直到最近。

　　除了那些以工作和人身安全为赌注参加罢工的农民工，中国还出现了其他形式的公民运动以及草根政治自信。

　　这种方兴未艾的政治觉醒，其有趣之处在于其表面上的非政治性。参与者没有口口声声要求自由民主，而是关注他们切身的经济利益、财产权和社会公正。比如那些在建造重污染工厂、无偿强占农田和强制城市居民搬家等问题上成功使得地方政府收手的例子等。批评政府提供公共服务和维护社会正义的政策及执行情况也是中国平面和网络媒体的常规题材。当然，表面非政治性的特点使政府更难以限制这些活动。

　　促成这种觉醒的有几种力量。很明显，信息革命--经济现代化的直接后果--促成了价值观的变化并降低了集体行为的组织成本。它还放大了这些行为的政治影响（甚至鼓励模仿），试想如果没有网络和手机，最近这些劳资纠纷的传播之快将是难以想象的。

　　人口流动性的增强是另一因素--随着普通民众有更多机会比较中国各地的差异，他们越发意识到其周围政治、经济的不公平，并越来越难对这种不公忍气吞声。

　　从某种重要意义上说，共产党惯用的平民主义论调为中国社会制造了许多期待。而讽刺的是，它同时又使其1989年后采取的推动经济高速增长的政策丧失了合法性，例如讨好外资企业，为增加投资减少社会开支，以及迫使数千万中国百姓做出了巨大的个人牺牲（接受低薪，丧失土地、住宅，从而为经济发展“做贡献”）。现在中国政府陷入了两难境地：一方面它抬高了人民的期许，另一方面满足这些期许是以经济上的高成本(更高的再分配和社会福利)以及政治上的高风险（更高的民众政治预期）为代价的。

　　中国公民社会被延后的政治觉醒将造成深刻的影响。经济上，政府要推行其不惜一切代价发展经济的“后天安门时期政策”将面临更大的困难。政治上，这也许会加剧精英间的分裂，因为他们中一部分人可能试图利用日益高涨的民粹主义实现其个人政治利益。

　　精英间的团结对一党制政体至关重要，高层领导间任何深层的裂痕都可能造成连锁反应，破坏稳定。另外，如果中国政府无法平息近来外企的劳工纠纷，怨愤可能向其他地方扩散（最有可能扩散到工作环境危险、工资收入奇低的建筑业和采矿业）。

　　虽然政治觉醒的到来令人欣喜地应证了“经济发展带来政治革新”的理论，但尚不能假设这一新现象将根本性地改变中国高度集权的政治秩序。1989年后，中国的公民社会缺乏独立的道德核心、组织网络以及有效领导。大多数挑战政府权威的活动都是混乱无序、缺乏组织以及昙花一现的。

　　但如果中国政府认为他们还能继续用老方法治理中国，那就大错特错了。时下这些劳资纠纷及中国社会价值观的大变迁都表明，今天的中国不一样了，过去的规则已派不上用场了。

　　作者系卡内基国际和平基金会的兼职高级研究员、克莱蒙特-麦肯纳学院(Claremont McKenna College)政治学教授裴敏欣。

　　英文原文：

　　China‘s Political Awakening？

　　July 14， 2010

　　By Minxin Pei

　　The current labour unrest isn’t as apolitical as it looks. But don‘t expect an early change in China’s autocratic leadership.

　　The ongoing labour unrest in China is seen by many as a labour market response to uncompetitive wages offered by foreign companies. And， to a large extent， this is true. Changing demographics are reducing the supply of ultra-cheap young labourers from the countryside to coastal export-processing zones， giving labour more bargaining power.

　　But explaining China‘s newly assertive workers purely on economic grounds misses the larger-and more interesting-political context. For labour activism is only one of the many signs of a broader political re-awakening in Chinese civil society.

　　For years， Western observers have been disheartened by the lack of political change in China. Modernization theory predicts that rapid economic progress should help liberalize the political system， but this hasn’t occurred in China since 1989. Until now.

　　In addition to migrant workers who have risked their jobs and personal safety in joining the strikes， China has seen other forms of civic activism and political assertiveness at the grassroots level.

　　What‘s interesting about this new political reawakening is that on the surface it doesn’t look all that political. Instead of calling for democracy and freedom， participants in these activities focus on issues directly related to their economic interests， property rights and social justice. Examples include fighting off local governments‘ attempts to build polluting factories， seize farmers’ land without compensation and evict urban residents from their homes. Criticism of government policy and performance in delivering public services and protecting social justice are routine in Chinese publications and on-line venues. And， of course， the ostensibly apolitical nature of such civic activism makes it much harder for the Communist Party to suppress it with brutal force.

　　Several forces have contributed to the reawakening. Clearly， the information revolution-a direct result of economic modernization-has helped change values and reduced the costs of organizing collective action. It has also magnified the political impact of such moves (even inspiring copycat action)， while the rapidity with which the latest labour unrest has spread would have been inconceivable without the assistance of the Internet and cell phones.

　　Rising physical mobility of the population is another factor-as ordinary Chinese citizens have more opportunities to compare how conditions differ among China‘s diverse localities， they acquire a greater awareness of the political and social injustice of their own surroundings and become less tolerant of such injustices.

　　In an important sense， the Communist Party’s own populist rhetoric has fuelled the expectations of Chinese society and， ironically， de-legitimized many of Beijing‘s post-1989 policies that contributed to China’s rapid economic growth， such as courting foreign businesses， reducing social spending to boost investment and forcing tens of millions of ordinary Chinese to make enormous personal sacrifices (accepting low wages and losing their land and apartments for the sake of rapid economic growth). Now the Chinese government faces a dilemma： it has raised the people‘s expectations， but meeting those expectations would be economically costly (more redistribution and social welfare) and politically risky (greater popular political participation).

　　The delayed political awakening of China’s civil society will have profound consequences. Economically， it will make it much harder for the government to continue to pursue its post-Tiananmen strategy of promoting economic growth at all cost. Politically， it may lead to greater disunity within the elites since some of them may be tempted to exploit rising populism for personal political advantage.

　　For a one-party regime for which elite unity is critical， any deep schisms within its top leadership could trigger a chain of de-stabilizing events. In addition， if the Chinese authorities fail to end the current labour unrest in foreign-invested firms， disgruntlement will likely spread to workers in other sectors (most likely in construction and mining， where working conditions are dangerous and pay extremely low).

　　Still， while the political awakening comes as a pleasant confirmation of the theory that economic progress will bring about political change， it can‘t be assumed this emerging phenomenon will fundamentally change China’s autocratic political order. As a result of the post-Tiananmen repression， China‘s civil society lacks independent centres of public morality， organizational networks and effective leadership. Most activities that challenge government authority are uncoordinated， disorganized and short-lived.

　　But if the Party thinks that it can continue to rule China in the same old way， it would be mistaken. If anything， the on-going labour unrest and the seismic shift in values in Chinese society show that the Party is governing a different country， where the old rules no longer apply.

　　Minxin Pei is an Adjunct Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College